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Abstract In this paper I get clearer on the considerations that ought to inform the
evaluation and development of medico-legal competency criteria—where this is
taken to be a question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for a patient to
be found competent in medico-legal contexts. In the ‘‘Decisional Competency in
Medico-Legal Contexts’’ section I explore how the question regarding the abilities
that ought to be needed for decisional competence is to be interpreted. I begin by
considering an interpretation that takes the question to be asking about the abilities
needed to satisfy an idealized view of competent decision-making, according to
which decisional competency is a matter of possessing those abilities or attributes
that are needed to engage in good or effective or, perhaps, substantially autonomous
or rational decision-making. The view has some plausibility—it accords with the
way decisional competency is understood in a number of everyday contexts—but
fails as an interpretation of the question regarding the abilities that should be needed
for decisional competence in medico-legal contexts. Nevertheless, consideration of
why it is mistaken suggests a more accurate interpretation and points the way in
which the question regarding the evaluation of medico-legal competency criteria is to
be answered. Building on other scholarly work in the area, I outline in the ‘‘Primary
and Secondary Requirements’’ section several requirements that deci-sional
competence criteria ought to satisfy. Then, in the ‘‘Applying the Framework’’ section,
I say something about the extent to which medico-legal competency cri-teria, as well
as some models of decisional competency proposed in the academic literature, fulfil
those requirements.
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Introduction
It is a fundamental ethical and legal tenet that the decision-making of competent 
adult patients with respect to their treatment and care is to be respected. This means 
that doctors and other appropriately qualified professionals must obtain the 
informed and voluntary consent of a patient before treating the patient or carrying 
out any sort of procedure. It means also that the refusals of competent adult patients 
to treatment must be respected.1 One of the few circumstances in which it might not 
be necessary to respect an adult patient’s decision-making—in either of the ways 
just outlined—is when a patient fails to be competent. In such a case it might be 
permissible for doctors and other appropriately qualified professionals to interfere 
with a patient’s decision-making—for instance, by overriding a patient’s refusal of 
treatment—if that is in the best interests of the patient as evaluated by the healthcare 
providers or a surrogate decision-maker.
In many liberal jurisdictions, including the UK, the US, and Canada, competence
determinations by doctors and others are governed by law [4]. This is proper and
sensible, given that, as we have seen, such determinations serve to distinguish
between those who should and those who should not retain decisional authority [5,
20]. As one commentator puts it, ‘‘there is no more profound infringement of the
rights of citizens than the determination that they are incompetent’’ [2], p 374, and,
therefore, it is entirely appropriate that competence determinations are governed by
strict legal principles. But this means there is a need to ensure that medico-legal
decisional competency criteria—the standards by which competence determinations
are judged and which usually make reference to certain decision-making abilities
including those relating to understanding, deliberation and communication [4, 20]—
are defensible; for if they are not the law will be allowing a degree of state
interference that ought not be allowed and which would likely lead to unacceptable
violations of people’s sovereignty rights.
My concern in this paper is to get clearer on the considerations that ought to
inform the evaluation of medico-legal criteria for decisional competence—where
this is taken to be a question regarding the abilities or attributes that ought to be
needed for somebody to be found competent in medico-legal contexts. In the
‘‘Decisional Competency in Medico-Legal Contexts’’ section I explore how the
question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for competence is to be
interpreted. I begin by considering an interpretation that takes the question to be
asking about the abilities that are needed to satisfy an idealized view of competent
decision-making, according to which decisional competency is a matter of
possessing those abilities or attributes that are needed to engage in good or
effective or, perhaps, substantially autonomous or rational decision-making. The
view has some plausibility—it accords with the way decisional competency is
understood in a number of everyday, including clinical, contexts—but fails as an
interpretation of the question regarding the abilities that should be needed for
1 The requirement to respect competent patients’ decision-making is not normally taken to extend to
patients’ requests for treatment, however, because the degree to which requests should be respected will
depend on such things as availability of resources and consideration of whether what is requested is
clinically indicated (see [11], [35]).
decisional competency in medico-legal contexts. Nevertheless, consideration of why
it is mistaken suggests a more accurate interpretation and points the way in which the
question regarding the evaluation of medico-legal competence criteria is to be
answered. Building on other scholarly work in the area, I outline in the‘‘Primary and
Secondary Requirements’’ section several requirements that decisional competency
criteria ought to satisfy. Then, in the ‘‘Applying the Framework’’ section, I say
something regarding the extent to which existing medico-legal criteria, as well as
some models of competence proposed in the academic literature, fulfil those
requirements.
What I have to say is aimed primarily at the evaluation of medico-legal
competence criteria. However, my claims are just as relevant to the evaluation of
competence criteria utilised in clinical instruments for assessing competence
including the widely adopted MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for
Treatment (MacCATT-T).2 This is for two reasons. First, these clinical instruments 
largely serve to aid clinicians and other relevant professionals to decide whether or
not to allow a person retain decisional authority. Therefore, we would expect
competence criteria utilised in those tools to satisfy the same requirements that
medico-legal criteria need to satisfy. Second, competence criteria used in clinical
instruments for assessing competence will need to reflect competency criteria
adopted in law (and, therefore, satisfy the same requirements governing medico-legal
criteria for competence), as otherwise clinicians and other relevant profes-sionals
relying on those instruments will be at risk of behaving unlawfully, which would be
unacceptable; a consideration that in large part must explain why the MacCATT-T is
a tool that was designed anyway to help clinicians to measure abilities that the legal
system had already identified as relevant to competence (see [20]).
Decisional Competency in Medico-Legal Contexts
Although there is some variation between different jurisdictions, many consider
decisional competency to comprise decisional abilities such as understanding and
appreciation, retention of information, and deliberation of risks and benefits [4, 20].
For instance, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 [26], which governs clinical practice in
England and Wales (though not Scotland or Northern Ireland) outlines in S.3(1) four
abilities that are required for competence (or ‘capacity’ as it is referred to in the Act),
namely, the abilities to understand information relevant to the decision, to retain the
information, to use or weigh the information as part of the process of making the
decision, and to communicate the decision (whether orally or by other means). Note
that, as is the case elsewhere, medico-legal competency criteria in England and
Wales are task-specific; a person might possess the abilities in question with respect
to one health-care decision but not with respect to another, and for that reason
competency ought to be assessed for each health-care decision that has to be made. It
is important to recognise as well that ‘decisional competence’ in medico-
2 For a helpful review of different assessment instruments, see Dunn et al. [17].
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Now one way of interpreting the question of whether medico-legal competency
criteria reflect appropriate standards for decisional competency is to take that
question to be asking whether these criteria describe the decision-making abilities
that are needed to satisfy some idealized view of competent decision-making. On this
way of interpreting the question, we get clear on the abilities or attributes that are
needed to engage in good or effective or, perhaps, substantially autonomous or
rational decision-making, possibly by means of examining our intuitions regarding
hypothetical or real-life cases where people appear to be displaying decision-making
defects. For instance, after reflecting on particular cases, we might come to think that
competent (that is to say, good or effective or substantially autonomous) decision-
making involves choosing in a way that accords with one’s ‘underlying and enduring
values’ [5, 13], or having ‘recognisable reasons’ for the decisions one makes [8, 19],
or possessing the ability to make a ‘rational decision’ [14]. And, then, we enquire
into whether existing medico-legal competency criteria properly reflect those
idealized views of competency or the capacities or attributes needed to satisfy such
views.
For instance, Louis Charland [6] describes research conducted by Antonio
Damasio [15], which suggests that people lacking certain emotional capacities are
unable to engage in ‘competent’ or ‘effective’ decision-making. Charland observes
that these patients ‘‘turn out to be unable to plan effectively for the future, to show a
marked absence of affect, to behave in self-destructive ways that violate their best
interests, and to be unable to maintain healthy and steady social and personal
relationships’’ [6], p. 73), concluding that ‘‘many existing tests and models for the
determination of competence’’ (including, we can suppose, clinical and legal tests of
decisional competence) might need to be revised so to ensure that only those people
who have the right emotional capacities are found competent [6], p. 78; see also [7].3 
In similar fashion, other commentators have argued that existing competency tests
might make insufficient reference to people’s values. For instance, Jacinta Tan and
colleagues [34] explored whether the values of people with anorexia-nervosa—for
instance, the value attached to being thin—might compromise capacity by virtue of
being ‘pathological’ or ‘inauthentic’, or, in other words, resulting from an illness. If
so, perhaps something like ‘authentic values’ needs to be a component of decisional
competence criteria as well (see also [9, 37]).
Notice, then, that both Charland and Tan et al. seem to be suggesting that
decisional competency in clinical and legal contexts ought to be a matter of whether
3 For the view that competence criteria should include ‘coherency of preferences’ as a component, so to
accommodate difficulties in decision-making that people with major depression experience, see Rudnick
[32].
a person satisfies some sort of decision-making ideal, where for Charland it is a
matter of whether a person can do such things as ‘plan effectively for the future’ and
‘maintain healthy and steady social and personal relationships’ and for Tan et al. a
matter of whether a person is able to act or decide in ways that reflect an authentic
set of values (and thereby, it might be held, be able to make decisions that count as
properly autonomous decisions, ones that are expressive of that person’s enduring
values and commitments). Again, the idea seems to be that we begin with some
account of good or effective or substantially autonomous decision-making—an
account that might be informed by empirical data such as that described by
Charland and Tan et al.—and then we use that account to evaluate existing legal and
clinical competency criteria. To the extent to which it is discovered that competency
criteria diverge sufficiently from the decision-making ideal, a strong case exists for
amending the criteria in a way that reflects better the decision-making ideal in
question.
The view that medico-legal decisional competence criteria should be evaluated
according to whether those criteria satisfy an idealized version of competent
decision-making can seem compelling. In many everyday contexts questions
pertaining to decisional competence are questions pertaining to idealized views of
competency. Such views seek to describe the sorts of decisional capacities that
might be considered to be desirable or better or valuable for people to have—
capacities that might be missing in the sorts of cases described by Charland and
Tan et al., for instance—and are often employed because they provide us with
decision-making ideals with which we might evaluate, and occasionally try to
improve on, our own and other people’s decision-making. This is true also in the
clinical context where doctors might be concerned to help patients develop or
restore their decision-making capacities. It might seem natural to suppose the
same is true with respect to the way ‘decisional competency’ is to be understood
in medico-legal contexts, that the medico-legal view of decisional competence is
an idealized one. Moreover, it seems likely that many idealized views will include
several, perhaps all, those capacities that find expression in medico-legal criteria
for competence, such as understanding and retention of information. Again, this
might lead us to suppose that decisional competence in medico-legal contexts is
about those capacities needed to satisfy an idealized view of competent decision-
making.
But the question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for competence in
the medico-legal context is not the question regarding the abilities needed to satisfy
some kind of idealized view. As outlined at the beginning of the paper, in medico-
legal contexts competence determinations principally function to distinguish
between patients whose decision-making must be respected and patients whose
decision-making it might be permissible not to respect. However, it is an entirely
open question whether the abilities that are needed to satisfy an idealized view of
competency—or, in other words, the abilities that might be needed to engage in
good or effective or substantially autonomous decision-making—are the same
abilities that ought to decide who does and does not retain decisional authority.
Idealized views can serve an important role in many everyday contexts, but there is
no a priori reason why we should suppose that such views ought to decide who
should and should not retain decisional authority.4 And, in fact, it seems likely, as I 
argue at greater length in the ‘‘Applying the Framework’’ section, that conforming
competence criteria to an idealized view will threaten to set the standard too high in
terms of deciding who should and should not be allowed to have decisional
authority.5
As way of illustration, consider those patients who refuse live-saving treatment
because of an ‘irrational fear’ of the treatment in question. A number of
commentators have claimed that such patients ought to be found incompetent even
though it can be supposed they understand their situation and are able to deliberate
regarding the risks and benefits of having the treatment, and for that reason are likely
to satisfy existing medico-legal criteria for competence (see, for instance, [14, 36]).
The patient has very good reason to accept the treatment (again we can suppose this
is recognised by the patient) and would consent if not for the presence of an irrational
fear. Now, we might allow that these patients would fail to satisfy many idealized
views of competent decision-making, as their failure to consent does seem to count
as a serious decision-making shortcoming of theirs. Nevertheless, it is not obvious
that it would be right for the law to view such patients as incompetent for the purpose
of something as serious as permitting (perhaps requiring) removing from them their
decisional authority. Of particular importance here is a question regarding
proportionality: would the value served by decisional competence criteria that would
find these patients incompetent be proportionate to the harm that the presence of such
criteria would likely cause (both to patients and people in society more generally)?
And it might be observed that there are a number of areas parallel to the irrational
fear case where the state is reluctant to interfere or legislate owing to worries
regarding proportionality. For instance, even though it would be better for people not
to participate in high-risk gambling activities (including, we might suppose, by many
gamblers’ own lights), the state is generally very reluctant to stop people from doing
this—and it would seem reluctant precisely because it is aware of the need to ensure
that in a liberal society people are given the freedom to enable them and society to
flourish (including the freedom to make decisions that are unwise or not in their best
interests, even as they might themselves acknowledge), even if, regrettably, that
means some people come to serious harm as a result.
If this is correct, then the right way to interpret the question regarding the
abilities or attributes that ought to be included in decisional competence criteria is
not to be asking what abilities are needed to satisfy an idealized view of competent
decision-making (as it is uncertain that such views ought to determine who should
and should not retain decisional authority) but to be asking only (something like)
4 To be clear, then, the claim is not that medico-legal decisional competency criteria fail to set standards
against which decision-making can be assessed; for clearly they do. Rather the claim is that the standards
that medico-legal decisional competency criteria set are those standards that a person’s decision-making
would need to achieve in order for that person to be allowed to retain decisional authority, and there is no
a priori reason for supposing that those standards are or should be the same standards that need to be
achieved in order for someone’s decision-making to satisfy some kind or decision-making ideal.
5 See also Appelbaum’s rejoinder to Charland [6]: ‘‘[B]efore expanding the traditional, cognitively
oriented elements of standards of competence to include a component focused on emotional capacity, one
ought to require compelling evidence that the change will produce more benefit than harm’’ ([2], p.384).
what abilities or attributes (or set of abilities or attributes) the presence of which in a
person should afford that person (legal) protection from state interference and the
absence of which in a person should afford no such protection and might even
require state interference with a person’s decision-making. This way of interpreting
the question tells us nothing about the nature of the considerations relevant to
answering the question, although the need to satisfy a condition of proportionality is
clearly one such consideration; I say more on this in the next section. But, it does
throw into sharp relief that questions pertaining to appropriate standards for
decisional competency are essentially questions pertaining to the acceptable limits
of state intervention, and need to be answered with that thought very clearly in
mind. And it serves to remind us as well that it cannot be supposed that the
constructs that are employed in medico-legal contexts need have the same meaning
than when used in some other every day, including clinical, contexts.
Primary and Secondary Requirements
I have sought to show, via discussion of the idea of utilising an idealized view of
competent decision-making as a model for competence criteria in medico-legal
contexts, that the evaluation of medico-legal competence criteria is an evaluation of
the legal criteria governing which patients should and should not retain decisional
authority with respect to their treatment and care—where consideration of the
irrational fear case suggests that core to any such evaluation is the need for
competence criteria to be proportionate. However, it is clear there are a number of
requirements in addition to that relating to proportionality that medico-legal
competence criteria ought to satisfy. In brief, medico-legal competence criteria need
to be effective, proportionate, minimally-infringing, necessary, and equitable—
where the rationale for these is that they seem to reflect accurately our considered
view of what constitutes good law or policy, at least in liberal states. Moreover,
instrumental to satisfying these (what we might call) primary requirements is the
need for competence criteria to satisfy a number of secondary requirements,
including the need to be clearly definable and for the abilities or attributes in question
to be possible to assess or measure in a reliable way by clinicians and other relevant
professionals (cp. [2], p. 385).
The primary requirements listed are familiar to other contexts (for instance,
Childress et al. [10] outline several such requirements with respect to the evaluation
of public health interventions). Moreover, some of these requirements find
expression in other scholarly work on appropriate standards for decisional
competence. For instance, Paul Appelbaum recognises a requirement of propor-
tionality when he states that expanding competence criteria to include emotional
capacity ‘‘ought to require compelling evidence that the change will produce more
benefit than harm’’ ([2], p. 384). And Jessica Berg et al. [3], p. 377 are recognising a
requirement of minimal infringement when they claim that although ‘‘seriously
impaired people should be protected, the right to make decisions for oneself should
not be burdened more than is absolutely necessary’’.6 Nevertheless, I am not aware 
of these requirements having anywhere been spelt out in a comprehensive and 
systematic way with respect to the evaluation of medico-legal competency criteria. 
In what follows, then, I build on existing scholarly work by explaining the 
requirements that competence criteria ought to satisfy in a more methodical and 
complete way than has been done to date—and by doing so provide something in 
the way of a useable framework with which decisional competency criteria can be 
evaluated.
To begin with, medico-legal competence criteria need to be effective in that their
presence will succeed (or help to succeed) to achieve the fundamental goals that
those criteria are designed to achieve, including the protection of people whose
decision-making capacities have been compromised by injury or illness. If medico-
legal competence criteria failed to be effective their presence would be unjustified
because useless and potentially harmful for no benefit. Second, competence criteria
need to be proportionate in that the achievement of the intended goal or goals is
proportionate to the evils or harms that their presence is likely to cause. For
instance, even if the presence of a criterion would succeed in helping to ensure some
patients are protected from harm, such a criterion is unlikely to be justified if its
presence is likely to lead to much greater harm (where that might take the form of
serious distress to patients or the public at large, or the form of comprising a
violation of people’s rights to self-determination that would be considered
unacceptable in a liberal society). Third, medico-legal competence criteria need
to be minimally-infringing in that the criteria should lead to minimal interference
with other important goods. For instance, decisional competence determinations
should cause minimal interference with people’s sovereignty interests, as well as
minimal distress to patients and the public at large. Fourth, medico–legal decisional
competence criteria need to be necessary in that the existence of such criteria is
essential to protect the goods in question. Competence criteria will lack justification
if there are alternative but more acceptable ways of achieving the intended goals.
For instance, if it were possible to protect decisionally impaired patients without
removing from them their decisional authority, then the presence of competence
criteria would be very hard to justify. Fifth, competence criteria need to be equitable
in that they do not discriminate unfairly, as might be the case, for instance, if those
criteria would lead to the removal of decisional authority from patients on the basis
of their age, colour or gender, or if those criteria risk bringing it about that patients
with similar needs in very similar circumstances are treated very differently.
Moreover, instrumental to the satisfaction of the primary requirements just
outlined, is the need for medico-legal decisional competence criteria to be clearly
definable and for it to be possible for doctors and other relevant professionals to test
the abilities or attributes in question (and thereby people’s decisional competency) in
a reliable manner (cp. [2], p. 379, [38]). If the constructs employed in medico-legal
competence criteria are ill-defined or the capacities in question difficult to
6 Other scholarly work containing relevant and insightful discussion, especially with regards to the need
for the law to be proportionate in terms of the restrictions imposed on patients’ autonomy or decision-
making, include [25] (especially pp. 60–63), and [12] (especially pp. 524–534).
assess, then it is likely that people with similar levels of capacity will be treated
differently with respect to whether they are allowed to retain decisional authority
(hence, not satisfying a condition of equity), and that the interests of patients and
members of the public more generally will not be protected adequately (hence,
threatening not to meet conditions of effectiveness, proportionality, and minimal-
infringement, for instance).
It is possible there are requirements other than those outlined that medico-legal 
competence criteria need to satisfy. For instance, no mention has been made of the 
need for competence criteria to comply with international and human rights 
obligations. This has been omitted because it might be argued that compliance with 
such obligations will demand only that decisional competence criteria satisfy the 
secondary and primary requirements outlined already: compare, for instance, a 
condition of equity and Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
prohibiting discrimination on such grounds as age and ethnicity. But, there might be 
reason to hold otherwise, that, in other words, compliance with international and 
human rights obligations should be a condition in addition to those outlined already. 
Also, each of the primary and secondary requirements outlined above might be 
expanded on. Regarding a condition of proportionality, for instance, it is likely there 
are considerations in addition to those outlined above that are relevant to assessing 
proportionality, including the likely effects that competence criteria might have on 
the public’s perception of and trust in doctors and other health and social care 
professionals. Patients will seek medical advice and care only if they trust those 
responsible for treating and caring for them; therefore, any criterion that threatens to 
harm the relationship of trust between patients and relevant professionals will count 
strongly against that criterion. Moreover, it is important to emphasise as well that 
assessing whether decisional competency criteria satisfy a condition of proportion-
ality will require assigning conflicting considerations their respective weightings 
and making an overall assessment of which considerations ought to preside. And 
although the issue needs more discussion than can be given here, I take it that 
conflicting considerations will need to be weighed in a way that reflects the core 
liberal values that underpin the law and which the law is designed to protect and 
promote. This is likely to mean, for instance, that the need to respect people’s 
sovereignty interests is to be assigned a greater weighting than the need to protect 
people from their potentially harmful decision-making. In a liberal society people 
should normally be allowed to conduct their lives in the way that they choose or see 
fit (as long as they do not maim or injure others) even if, regrettably, that means some 
people suffer serious harm as a consequence of their decision-making.7
The claim that medico-legal competence criteria need to satisfy a condition of
proportionality bears some resemblance to Buchanan and Brock’s view regarding
how a patient’s decisional competence is to be evaluated [4, 5]. These authors draw
7 The point applies to the evaluation of decisional competency criteria in societies that broadly share the
liberal values of most North American and European states. These are the medico-legal criteria and legal
contexts with which this paper is concerned. The question of how states that do not share such values are
to evaluate decisional competency criteria (where these criteria exist) and weigh conflicting
considerations is an extremely complex matter and a question that I am not able to answer at the
present time.
on a principle of proportionality when they argue that the level of decisional capacity
needed for competence should reflect an acceptable balance between respecting the
patient’s decision-making or autonomy on the one hand and ensuring risks to the
patient are minimised on the other. This gives rise to the ‘risk-related’ (or ‘sliding-
scale’) view of competence (see also [16, 20]). For Buchanan and Brock the higher
the risk to an individual patient posed by a medical intervention, the higher the level
of capacity required in order for the patient to be found competent and to be allowed
to retain decisional authority. Conversely, the lower the risk posed to a patient, the
lower the level of capacity required for competence. However, there are important
differences between the Buchanan and Brock approach and the claims made in this
paper. In particular, whereas Buchanan and Brock are saying that considerations of
proportionality are relevant to assessing an individual patient’s competence nothing
of the sort is being assumed in the preceding discussion. In this paper competence is
being treated as a legal determination solely and for that reason is a matter to be
decided entirely on the basis of whether a person satisfies medico-legal criteria for
competence. Consequently, if those criteria adopt a ‘fixed’ view of competence—that
is a view according to which the abilities or level of capacity required for
competence is the same (or remains fixed) for all patients and all treatment decisions
—then satisfaction of those criteria will be sufficient to establish competence
irrespective of the level of risk. In that case, risks to the patient will be relevant to
determining competence only in so far as they are relevant to assessing whether a
patient satisfies competence criteria, as might be the case, for instance, if a certain
level of cognitive ability is required for the risks to be understood adequately (cp.
[39], p. 97).8 On the view defended in this paper a condition of proportionality is 
taken to govern not individual assessments of competence, but rather is taken to be
relevant to evaluating the medico-legal criteria on which assessments of competence
are to be based. And, of course, assessing whether medico-legal competence criteria
satisfy a condition of proportionality will require weighing a far wider range of
considerations than those relating to the interests of any one patient. Competence
criteria potentially affect everyone and have wide-reaching consequences in terms of
their effectiveness and harms they might cause—and these all need to be taken into
account when evaluating whether or not decisional competence criteria are
proportionate.
8 Of course, it is consistent with a fixed view of competence that decisions carrying greater risk should
require more rigorous evaluation of competence (see [20]; but for a sceptical note regarding the extent to
which healthcare professionals do assess competence, even with regards to more serious treatment
decisions, see [23], p. 109). Also, on a fixed view, risks are likely to be relevant to evaluating the best
interests of a patient that is found to be incompetent. For instance, a treatment carrying a high risk of
harmful side-effects is less likely to be in a patient’s best interests than an equally effective treatment
carrying little or no risk of harmful side-effects, especially where there is nothing to suggest that the higher
risk option is more in keeping with the patient’s beliefs or values and/or past wishes (see S.4 of the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 [26]). It is an important question—but one that cannot be explored here—whether the
law should adopt a risk-related or fixed view (but for relevant discussion see [39], [3], [20],[4]).
Applying the Framework
It is now possible to say something more regarding the extent to which existing and
proposed competence criteria satisfy the requirements outlined in the preceding
section. In what follows, I suggest that although there is reason to think that existing
medico-legal criteria satisfy those requirements, there is much less reason for
optimism regarding proposed alternatives that draw on more idealized views of
competent decision-making.
To begin with, consider the Mental Capacity Act 2005 [26], which, as explained in
the ‘‘Decisional Competency in Medico-Legal Contexts’’ section, outlines in S.3(1)
four abilities needed for decisional competence, namely, the abilities to understand
information relevant to the decision, retain the information, use or weigh the
information as part of the process of making the decision, and to communicate the
decision. Consideration of these criteria suggests that they might satisfy the
requirements outlined above. For instance, the criteria seem to satisfy a condition of
effectiveness, since they succeed in helping to ensure that many people whose
decision-making has been impaired by injury or illness (including those who are very
confused due to such things as stroke, dementia, brain-injury, and learning disability)
are protected from the harmful consequences of their decision-making. There is
reason also to think that medico-legal criteria satisfy a principle of proportionality,
since on the face of it the criteria reflect standards for competence that achieve a
satisfactory balance between on the one hand protecting people from the harmful
consequences of their impaired decision-making and on the other hand helping to
ensure that most people can for most of the time exercise significant personal
sovereignty and in a way that is conducive to a flourishing society (and one in which
trust in doctors and other professionals is maintained). Existing medico-legal
competence criteria appear also to satisfy a condition of equity. For instance, the
criteria do not discriminate on grounds such as age, ethnicity or gender (it is of
particular note here that S.2(3) of the Act prohibits making capacity assessments on
the basis of age, condition or appearance—where ‘appearance’ is interpreted widely
to include such things as skin colour and the way people dress: see Chapter 4 of the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice [27]), and those criteria ought to be
possible to apply consistently, since the constructs they utilise are useable and not too
difficult to define and the capacities to which those criteria refer can be assessed in a
reliable manner9 (cp. [37])—thereby satisfying the two secondary requirements 
described above. Fourth, there is reason to think that competence criteria are
minimally-infringing. Of particular note here is the fact that competence criteria are
task-specific. For instance, with respect to the understanding component, a person is
to be found incompetent only if he or she fails to understand information relevant to
the decision at hand. Consequently, a person might possess the abilities required with
respect to other decisions to be made. This helps to ensure that people’s autonomy
interests are interfered with minimally. Finally, there is reason to think
9 This is not to say that there might be some difficult cases such as when, for instance, a person refuses to
discuss his or her reasons for consenting to or refusing treatment; thereby making it difficult to assess
whether the person has weighed (or even understood) the information relevant to that decision.
medico-legal competence criteria satisfy a condition of necessity; for it is unclear
how the law could protect people whose decisional capacities have been severely
compromised by injury or illness unless the law contained competency criteria
referring to the sorts of decisional abilities to which existing medico-legal criteria
do refer.
Regarding the claim that medico-legal competence criteria should make reference
to those abilities or attributes needed to satisfy some sort of idealized view of
competent decision-making, there does seem to be reason to be sceptical. One initial
worry is that there are a number of idealized views of competent decision-making,
which gives rise to the difficult task of saying which idealized view of competency
the law ought to adopt. A more substantial worry is that it seems likely that an
idealized view of decisional competency will fail one or more of the conditions
governing medico-legal competence criteria outlined above. And here it is instructive
to note that many idealized views require the possession of decisional abilities that
are not included in medico-legal competence criteria. Consider, for instance, the
view that competency is the ability to make ‘rational decisions’ [14] or the view that
competency requires a ‘minimally consistent and stable set of values’ or the ability to
choose in accordance with such values [5]. But although S.3(1) of the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 [26] holds that decisional competence requires the ability ‘to use
or weigh the information as part of the process of making the decision’, it says
nothing about how the information is to be used or weighed, as to whether, for
instance, the information needs to be weighed or used in a way that might result in
the making of a rational decision or a decision that is consistent with a person’s
underlying and enduring values. And it is reasonable to suppose that the law omits
such abilities because it takes the view that those abilities would fail to satisfy the
primary and secondary requirement outlined above. In part, this might be owing to
concerns regarding definition and measurement (for instance, how are clinicians to
define and reliably measure a person’s ‘enduring and underlying values’, or a
‘rational decision’?). But, it is likely also to be owing to a worry that even if such
abilities or attributes can be defined and measured, including such abilities in
medico-legal competence criteria will still fail to satisfy one or more of the primary
requirements, including those relating to proportionality and necessity.
With respect to a condition of proportionality the worry is likely to be that if
competence criteria were to refer to the sorts of abilities that might be needed to
satisfy some more idealized view of competency, then this would set the standard
too high, and would make permissible a degree of state interference that ought not
be allowed.10 As alluded in the‘‘Decisional Competency in Medico-Legal Contexts’’
10 That considerations of proportionality have been accorded a high degree of importance by those
responsible for shaping the law on decisional competence is supported by Coggon and Miola when they
observe with respect to Lord Donaldson’s judgement in the case of Re T (adult: refusal of medical
treatment) [29] that it ‘‘is reasonable to suppose that Lord Donaldson MR’s celebrated statement that the
law on decision-making should look to capacity rather than rationality is born of a concern to protect
plural, incommensurable moral values that exist amongst the population, and to safeguard people from
excessive interference in their decision-making’’ ([12], p. 527; italics in original). Compare also Mr
Justice Bodey’s judgement in the case of A Local Authority v A [1] when considering whether the ability
to understand information relevant to making a decision should include understanding the emotional and
social consequences of refusing contraception—what Bodey J referred to as a ‘social-consequences test’.
Bodey J writes at para [61]: ‘‘I am persuaded that this wider test would create a real risk of blurring the
section, it is a fundamental liberal value (and one conducive to a happy and
flourishing society) that people are normally allowed to make decisions that might be
unwise or not in their best interests, including where people’s decision-making might
not accord with their underlying and enduring values (even as they might themselves
recognise). Second, regarding a condition of necessity, it might be suggested that
there are alternative and more acceptable ways of managing some of the patients that
proponents of more idealized views would like to be found incompetent. For
instance, a number of commentators have argued that acceptance of more idealized
models of decision-making may allow the compulsory treatment or detainment of
patients with certain mental health conditions such as anorexia-nervosa or
depression. For example, if Abraham Rudnick’s ‘coherency of preferences’ is
accepted as a component of competence, then this might justify compulsory
treatment of people with severe depression, since according to Rudnick these patients
fail to possess a coherent set of preferences [32]. Now, we might agree that
conditions such as severe depression and anorexia-nervosa ought to warrant the law
sometimes allowing removing from these patients’ their decisional authority. But the
question is what might be the most acceptable way of the law doing this? We have
already seen that it would seem preferable for these patients not to be accommodated
by broadening competence criteria (as this is likely to set the standard too high in
terms of which patients should and should not be allowed to retain decisional
authority, and is likely to mean that competence criteria will have to utilise
constructs that are difficult to define and assess). So can these patients be
accommodated some other way? Arguably the answer is ‘yes’ and this for two
reasons. First, it is likely that many of these patients will be found to be incompetent
on existing medico-legal competency criteria (on this point, see also [2], p. 385,[21]).
For instance, many people suffering from severe depression might find it difficult to
retain or weigh relevant information and be found to be incompetent for those
reasons. But, moreover, many jurisdictions have designed separate legislation
governing the compulsory treatment and detainment of patients with mental illness,
where the issue is not whether the patient has capacity but rather whether the patient
is a risk to him or herself (or others) as a result of having a mental disorder. Of
course, the legal status quo might not be ideal. For instance, it is sometimes argued
that mental health law is more discriminating and reinforcing of prejudice than
mental capacity law (see, for instance, [33]). But even if this were true, the legal
status quo might be more acceptable than a legal system that sought to permit the
removal of decisional authority of people with mental illness by way of broadening
medico-legal decisional competency criteria.
It is unclear whether the considerations just outlined show conclusively that
medico-legal competency criteria should not comply with some more idealized view
of competent decision-making; for I think it might still remain an open, albeit
Footnote 10 continued
line between capacity and best interests. If part of the test were to involve whether the woman concerned
understood enough about the practical realities of parenthood, then one would inevitably be in the realms
of a degree of subjectivity, into which a paternalistic approach could easily creep.’’ And he goes onto say
at para [63]: ‘‘To apply the wider test would be to ‘set the bar too high’ and would risk a move away from
personal autonomy in the direction of social engineering’’. For further discussion, see [24].
remote, possibility that after careful consideration it will be concluded that
competency criteria should be revised in ways that better reflect some decision-
making ideal. For the reasons I give that seems an unlikely conclusion, but I am not
sure it can be ruled out definitively, at least yet. However, the considerations just
outlined pose proponents of more idealized versions of decisional competency with
a serious challenge. If such views are to find expression in medico-legal competency
criteria then this will need to be demonstrated, which will require giving a
convincing case for holding that legal adoption of the idealized view in question
would, notwithstanding the considerations I have outlined, satisfy the secondary and
primary requirements described in this paper. And I think that it is accurate to say
that no such case has been made to date.
Concluding Remarks
I have argued that the evaluation of medico-legal competence criteria is an
evaluation of the legal criteria governing which patients should and should not
retain decisional authority with respect to their treatment and care As such the
relevant question when assessing decisional competency criteria is whether those
criteria are, amongst other things, proportionate, necessary and minimally-
infringing, rather than whether they conform with some more idealized view of
competent decision-making—one important implication being that it is possible,
very likely even, that a system of law should tolerate and enshrine medico-legal
criteria for decisional competency that might sometimes lead to regrettable
outcomes because of patients making ‘poor’ decisions.
This paper has implications beyond the decisional competency case, of course.
For instance, there seems to be no reason why the primary and secondary
requirements outlined are not relevant also to the evaluation of areas of law aligned
closely to the decisional competency case but where competence is not necessarily
an issue. Consider whether and, if so, to what extent it is right for the state to
intervene in the decision-making of mature-minors, people with mental illness and
so-called ‘vulnerable adults’, for instance. The vulnerable adult case is worth
mentioning briefly because in recent years the High Court of England and Wales has
intervened to safeguard the interests of a number of adult persons deemed to be at
risk of harm or exploitation (owing to inherent features such as age or disability and/
or situational factors including social, cultural and economic circumstances: see [18],
pp. 240–241), whether or not legal capacity is present: see, for instance, Re G (An
Adult) [ 28], Re SK (An Adult) (Forced Marriage: Appropriate Relief) [30], Re SA
(Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) [31]. By way of exercising its inherent
protective jurisdiction the court has considered situations in which judicial
intervention might be initiated. Now, it is not possible to say here when, if at all,
interventions with regards to vulnerable adults who have capacity can be justified.
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that any legal provision in this area, including the
possible creation of a statutory framework for protecting vulnerable adults, will need
to satisfy the same requirements that medico-legal decisional competency criteria
need to satisfy. It is worrying to note, then, that academic commentary on
the court’s activity with respect to vulnerable adults has raised serious questions
regarding whether such conditions are being met in fact (see [18, 22, 24].11
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